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A depreciation of the euro is not the silver bullet to solve the
eurocrisis that many are looking for.
by Blog Admin
Some commentators are now advocating a devaluation of the euro, citing that this would
help the uncompetitive economies of the South to export more to non-EU countries as well
as benefiting the eurozone’s larger economies such as Germany. Bob Hancké  assesses
the merits of devaluing the currency, but finds that owing to the eurozone’s relatively closed
nature as a trade area, the process would likely exacerbate the current north/south current
account divergence.
Earlier this month, Harvard University’s Martin Feldstein wrote on the Guardian website in
f avour of  euro depreciation, saying that it would help to reduce current account def icits in Italy, Spain
and France and thus allow EMU to buy time f or a deeper reorganisation. His basic point is simple. If  the
problems of  the eurozone are expressions of  a f undamental divergence in relative competit iveness of
the export sectors of  dif f erent countries – usually pitt ing the north-west of  Europe against the south –
then a depreciation of  the single currency will have two ef f ects. It will allow the uncompetit ive economies
to export more outside the EMU, thus compensating f or their lack of  competit iveness vis-à-vis Germany
and its satellites with an increase to other EU and non-EU economies. And at the same time, it will allow
Germany to export even more, this t ime outside the eurozone, meaning that demand in Germany will rise,
imports will f ollow and other EMU economies will grow as a result.
Feldstein is not just anybody to come up with an idea f or the euro. Back when the single currency was
still a glint in European polit icians’ eyes, he warned f or the polit ical f all-out of  imposing a single monetary
policy on such dif f erent economies without the polit ical f ramework to support it. That said, there are, I
think, two problems with his proposal. Each one of  them signif icantly qualif ies the benef icial ef f ects of  a
euro depreciation. Combined they spell doom f or the idea.
The f irst one is that EMU is a relatively
closed trade zone, and much of  extra-EMU
trade is with the rest of  the EU member-
states, many of  which de f acto shadow the
euro. A depreciation of  the euro will
theref ore have a relatively small ef f ect on
trade. In f act, the idea has a perverse
ef f ect: since Germany is the machine tool
builder f or the rest of  Europe, its economy
will benef it twice f rom the euro’s
depreciation. Germany will not only export
more Mercedes and BMWs, but also more
machine tools to build Renaults, Peugeots
and FIATs. The current account divergence
between Germany (and its economic
satellites) and the rest of  the EMU might
actually increase as a result.
Second, since a depreciation of  the euro
will (almost by def init ion) not change relative terms of  trade within the eurozone, its net ef f ects are, at
best, unclear. In f act, things may be worse than that, since they are likely to be very similar to the f irst ten
years of  the euro, when the south grew relatively f ast. That boom implied that the south imported goods
f rom the north, without exporting as much as it imported. The consequence: growing current account
def icits, pitt ing the north-west versus the south and south-east – precisely what this idea seeks to
remedy.
The idea is, theref ore, in all likelihood not the silver bullet that everyone is looking f or to solve the
eurocrisis. Sure, demand in Germany has to rise. Something needs to be done to make southern
European economies better adapted to lif e in a single currency zone (leave out Greece f or the moment,
which needs a substantial Marshall plan, not a bit of  t inkering in the margins). It will also require some
f orm of  redistribution f rom wealthy creditor nations to weaker debtors, as a realignment of  current
accounts suggests. And it will, almost certainly, entail deeper polit ical integration. In other words, one
short- term and three long-term projects, all of  which are f ar f rom easy. Back to square one and on to the
next solution…
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.  
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